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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
HYDE PARK TO\Vi\, a 1nunicipal
corporation. Ph1intitf and Appellant,

GEORGE

CHA~IBERS

and TACY

CHAMBERS. his "·ife. E. S. CHAl\IBERS,
a single man. D.\ ,~ID J. \VEEKS,
and

~IARY \\~EEKS.

his \\·ife,

Dele-ndant.s and Respondents.

Respondent's Brief.
M. C. HARRIS,

Attorney for Respondents.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and_ .for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
HYDE PARK TOWN, a municipal
corporation. Plamtiff and Appellant,
YS.

GEORGE CHAMBERS and

TACl~

CHAMBERS, his wife, E. S. CHAMBERS,

a single man, DAVID J. WEEKS,
and l\IARY WEEKS, his wife,

Defendants and Respandents.

STATE}.IENT OF FACTS.

The facts involved in this case are rather fully covered in the Plaintiff's brief and only one or two slight additions or contradictions are herein recorded.

It is the contention of the defendants that even tho
there was no express agreement that they should give up
their culinaor streams as a part of the consideration of the
town

gran~hem these taps ,that under all the facts

and circumsta:nces there was an implied agreement that
as consideration for such taps the plaintiff ·could have any
additional water that might be

s~ved

from the culinary

,

streams of the defendants so that it is our contention that
the consideration for the taps was both the granting of the
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right of way and the culinary water rights of the defendants a·nd their predecessors.
Much of the lands involved in the defendants Weeks
case are pasture lands and hillside lands but he also cultivates a substantial portion of hi1s land, and all of the defendant Chambers' lands are under cultivation.
The question of the adaquacy of the water during all
of these times is disputed, it bei·ng the contention of the
defendants that whatever shortage there might have been
in Hyde Park was largely the result of roots getting in the
old pipe line and wastful practices in Hyde Park Town.

QUESTIONS INVOLVED.
The primary question involved is: Did the plaintiff
show such facts as to constitute a necessity for this condemnation proceeding?
'l,he defendants .contend and the court found that the
plaintiff already was the o\vner of the right of way sought
to be ·condemned and, therefore, it \vas not necessary or
proper to maintain this condemnation proceeding.
There is therefore, involved the question of whether
or not the plaintiff was at the time of the commencement
of this

acti~n

already the owner of the right of way sought

to be condemned.
It is co:nceeded that at the time Hyde Park acquired
its culinary water sy.stem (about 1910 or 1911) an oral
contract was entered into between the town of Hyde Park
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and the defendants 'Veeks and the predecessors in interest of the defendant Chambers, whereby the defendants
granted to the plaintiff substantially the same right of
way as they are seeking to condemn at which time the
town of Hyde Park granted to the defendants the rig·ht to
tap the plaintiff's pipe line for culinary and stock waterin~

purposes and that pursuant to the said agreement the

town constructed the pipe line over the right of way and

the defendants used the tap without interruption from
approximately 1911 to 1938.
The plaintiff claims that they do not own the right of
way as a result of this agreement for three reasons.
1st. That the oral agreement granting the right of
\\-ay and the right to tap the pipe line is void for fai1ure to
comply with the statute of frauds.
2nd. That the said contract is void because it violates
the constitutional provision which prohibits municipalities
from selling their water works systems.
3rd. That the contract is still an executory contract
and could be terminated by either party at amy time, and
apparently they contend that by commencing this proceeding they have elected to tenninate it.
In addition to these items the appellants charge that
a number of the Findings were not supported by the evidence.
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ARGU'MENT.
ASSIGNMENT No. 1.
This action was commenced in June 1937. The Answer
and Counterclaim was filed in April 1939 so that the assignment that the Findings that "plaintiff is the owner of
culinary water which supplies the defendants with culinary water"

i~s

clearly within the issues in this case and

what happened after April 1939 has no bearing on the

In Findings No. 20 the court expressly makes
no findings in this action as to damages if any sustained
by the defendants during the late spring and summer of
1939 so that this matter is reserved for future determi~na
tion should it arise in a proper action.
question.

ASSIGNMEN·T No.2.
Assignment No. 2 complains as to t·he Findings that
the defendant is the owner of adaquate water to supply
both the town and these defendants through the said pipe
line. Since this assignment goes to some important matters to be discussed later it will be necessary to examine
the record somewhat in detain! in connection therewith.
It should be remembered that the court also finds in Finding No. 10, as follows:
"That the Town of Hyde Park is the owner of
1.5 c.f.s. of water in their said culinary water
system which is sufficient to supply the 750 inhabitants of Hyde Park with 432 g_allons of water per
person per day and that there are approximately
181 families in Hyde Park using water so that there
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is sufficient \Vater to furnish each family of four
people 17~8 gallons per day. That 300 gallons per
day per person is a reasonable amount of water to
be allowed for culinary purpooes, and 1200 gallons
per day is a reasonable amount of water to be allowed to a family of four persons and that the
Town of Hyde Park is the owner of an adequate
supply of water for culinary purposes to supply
the defendants \vith water for human consumption and for cattle watering purposes in addition
to an adequate supply for all culinary purposes for
all of the inhabitants of the Town of Hyde Park
and that the use of the water in question by the defendants has not and will not seriously impair the
use and enjoyment by the citizens of Hyde Park of
their rights to the use of culinary water from the
said springs. That it does not appear that the
Town Board of Hyde Park has ever by any resolution or ordinance determined that the use of a
small portion of its water by the defendants as
hereafter described, has worked or will in the near
future bring abol}.t any water shortage to said
municipality nor its inhabitants."
and it is apparently this finding that is attacked by Assignments Number Two and Three.
It is conceded that the original finding prepared by
the court does contain the typographical or clerical error
that Hyde Park is the owner of 1.5 c.f.s. whioh should have
been one-half c.f.s.
In its finding No. 15 the court found that the quantity
of water owned by the plaintiff was one-half c.f.s. and that
is in accordance with the pleadings and evidence so that
the elerical error is apparent on the face of the finding
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and, therefore, 1should be harmless.

But \ve have no ob-

jection to the Supreme Court calling the matter to the
trial court's attention and a·sking that it be corrected as a
clerical or typographical error.
It

i~s

contended in plaintiff's brief that because the

witnesses on behalf of Hyde Park ·Town, namely the town
officers and former water masters, testified that at times
it was necessary to restrict the citizens of Hyde Park in
watering their lawns to two hours per day and also that at
times some parties living in the upper part of the town
were short of water that this evidence necessarily should
have been adopted by the court to find that Hyde Park was
short of water. The reasons that the trial court probably
declined to adopt t·his theory were not all stated by the
trial court but some reasons that appear proper to us are
the following:
1.
In the :Qr·st place the plaintiff's own testimony sho·ws
that since the construction of the new pipe line in 1937
there is no shortage of water.

Witness Fred Duce testi-

fied as follows: (Tr. 113, Ab. 44-45)
"Q: While you were mayor after you got this new

system constructed was there sufficient water to furnish
the citizens of Hyde Park culinary water?
A: Yes, sis.,_,
Witness Martin C. Reeder testified that there was no
shortage of water after the construction

of

the

new

·.system (Tr. 173).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'l

J. E. Hansen, the present water master testified on
direct examination (Tr. 204, Ab. 69) :
"I belieYe we have plenty of water but we have no
surplus at the present time."
And this same witness testified that at present the
witness Karby is using the overflow from the city reservoir for irrigation purposes.
All of the testimony indicates that during at least a
major portion of the time there was always an overflow at
the intake of the Hyde Park water system.
Foster Gordon also testified (Tr. 102, Ab. 42):
"Every time I have been there they had an overflow."
The witness Ephraim Weeks testif!ed that he always
saw an overflow at the intake box and he also testified on
the one occasion he went to the Hyde Park Reservoir there
was an overflow there (Tr. 134, Ab. 51).
The plaintiff's witness Geo. Z. Lamb who was appointed by the Town Board to negotiate this contract with
the defendants to furnish them water for the right of way
testified on direct· examination by Mr. Thurman as follows: That he was the mayor of the Hyde Park Board in
1911 when the water system was constructed (Tr. 209,
Ab. 58):

Q: Were you water master, at all?
A: When it was first installed, I was.
Q:Were you water master while you were a member
of the board?
A: Yes, sir.
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Q: Were you water maBter during the period of the

distribution of the water after the pipe line had been
completed?
A: For a little while.
Q: Did you make observations as to the efficiency of
the supply at that time to take care of the needs of the
people in Hyde Park?
A: We had sufficient.
Q·: You had sufficient?

A: At that time.
Q: Did you haye more than a sufficient?
A: Not much. Sometimes."

2.
The undisputed evidence in the case indicates that
much of the trouble was caused by the drain-pipe installed in plaintiff's pipe line leading from the spring to the
reservoir becoming clogged with roots between the intake
and the reservoir.
Plaintiff's wit:ne3is Kirby testified as follows (Tr. 220,
A b. 60):
"Q: You would go up and clean out the roots very often

while you were water master.
A: Yes, sir, I did."
Plaintiff'·s witness Georpe S. Daines on direct examination testified (Tr. 262, Ab. 71):

"A: I think the pipe line must have more or less got
clogged in places with roots. It was difficult to get the
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water along_ the line and g'et water to the reservoir.
was necessary to put in the new pipe.''

It

3.
However, the important testimony in the case which
bears out the courfs finding is the expert testimony of engineers Schaub and Clyde.
Mr. Schaub testified (Tr. 190, Ab. 52) that under

good engineering practice an engineer designing a culinary water system for a small community of this kind
would be satisfied with 200 gallon of water per person per
day for culinary water system and that this takes into
consideration all requirements for drinking, watering
flowers, gardens, lawns, etc.
Engineer Clyde, plaintiff's engineer, placed this
amount at between three and four hundred gallon (Tr.
240-241, Ab. 65) .
On cross examination Engineer Clyde admitted that
the co11sumption according to a table which he had supplied for human consumption was 30 gallons per day per
person and for each horse and head of cattle 10 gallons
per day. Taking Mr. Clyde's highest figures of 40 gallons
per day per person the daily consumption of 750 people
would be 30,000 and allowing a liberal estimate (and it
was only an estimate) of 2700 head of horses and cattle
would be another 27,000 gollons or a total of 57,000 gallons
per day for drinking and culinary purposes.
It is admitted, both in the pleading and in the evi-
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dence, that Hyde Park Town has one-half .c.f.oS. of water
which measured at t·he reservoir by Engineer Clyde actually showed that there wa;s being delivered at the Hyde
Park reservoir .55 c.f.8. (Tr. 252, A b. 68). One-half c.f.s.
equals 225 gallons per minute which equals 324,000 gallQns per day so that under plaintiff's engineer's own testimony Hyde Park has 57,000 gallons per day for drinking
and stock wateri·ng purposes and 267,000 gallons per day
for irrigating and other purposes. In thi.g connection Engineer Clyde testified that large

amount~s

of water were

required at times of fire. The undisputed evidence shows
that the capacity of the Hyde Park reservoir is 62,000
(Tr. 251) so that there is enough water fiowi:ng into the
Hyde Park reservoir each day to fill it five times and it is
submitted that any additional fire protection needed by
Hyde Park could be easily taken care of by increasing the
capacity of the reservoir and stopping the waste from the
present overflovv.

The undisputed evidence, therefore,

shows that Hyde Park now has enough water to supply its
750 citizens with 432 gallons per day. If '"e adopt the defendants' expert testimony this is more than tvvice as
much water as good engineering would require and if we
adopt the plaintiff\s engitneer's theory of 300 g·allons per
person per day Hyde Park has a

sur~lus

of 750 times 132

or approximately 99,000 gallons per day, and if we adopt
the 400 gallons

2~r

day, which is the greatest amount the

plaintiff's engineer would allow and is the most favorable
testimony in the record to them, Hyde Park still has a sur-
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plus of 24,000 gallons per day, 600 gallons of which will
supply the two tap of these defendants.
Plaintiff,s engineer also testified by way of comparison that in Logan "·here people are on meters the aver~o-e

consumption is 150 gallons per day per person and the

record also discloses that the usual meter arrangements is
a minimum charge for 10,000 gallons per m01nth per

meter or family.

·H~~de

Park has approximately 51,840

gallons per family of her people so that Hyde Park now
has approximately five times as much water as is usually

allowed as a minimum and the evidence in this case is that
the average use is about one-half the minimum and it,
therefore, seems that there is not only ample evidence to
sustain the Finding of the court in connection with Hyde
Park having ample water but the overwhelming weight
of the evidence demonstrates that Hyde Park has an excess of water over any reasonable requirements for culinary purposes.
It is common knowledge that cities frequently find it
necessary to make some restriction of hours for sprinkling
lawns. It is elementary that public policy as applied by
the courts must not encourage waste of water, particularly water fit for culinary

~urposes.

Bearing in mil)d the

equities and all the surrounding circumstances in this case
before this court s·hould stop these farmers from securing
drinking water and water for culinary and stock watering
purposes they might suggest to Hyde Park that they consider ending the waste there by installing meters.
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Defendants offered to show that similar contracts to
to the one in question exists in many of the communities
i:n Cache County (Tr. 182) and if this sort of practice
were to be condemned by this court it "rould mean ruin to
a lot of our fine farm families who are clinging to the soil
and to rural life and producing the kind of citizenry that
today is the countries greatest •need.

ASSIGNMENT No.7.
Plaintiff complains that there is no evidence to support the finding that the use of the water by the defendants was adverse and under claim of right. The plaintiff
admitted that these taps were installed by the Town of
Hyde Park and were used continuously until the year
1938 (Tr. 137) and both Weeks and Toolson (Chamber's
predecessor in interest) testified that the Town granted
them the right to the use of this water.

It is contended

that under these circum!stances the use was under a claim
of rig·ht and that there is no evidence of any permissive
use.
However, if this court should be convinced that the
Finding· as to adverse possession is not supported by the
e-vidence, the other evidence in the case is ample to support the judgment that the plaintiff is the owner of the
right of way and that thi>S proceeding in condemnation is
not necessary and for that reason any finding in connection with the matter of adverse use by the defendants of
the said waters would be harmless error even if the Sup-
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reme Court should conclude that it \vas not justified by
the evidence:
Butler vs. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 Pac. 869.
Thomas Ys. Foulgar, 71 Utah 274, 264 Pac. 975.
Plaintiff also claims that the proof is indefinite as to
the exact amount of water used and that the judgment
a:nd decree is so indefinite as to make the same void.
There is evidence as to the number of cattle that both
Weeks and Chambers customarily had on their premises,
and there is ample evidence as to the usual amount of
water allowed to a family for culinary and stockwatering
purposes and the judgment in this case that these defendants may not consume more than 300 gallons per day is
sufficiently definite to prevent any waste of water and no
cases cited by the plaintiff holds that order for a decree
for culinary water to be sufficiently definite must define
t·he number of people who take a drink, or the number of
drinks (of water) a man may take in a day, or the diferent size drinks that a man or a boy might take, or the
number of cattle permitted to drink at these taps. It has
abundantly been demonstrated heretofore that 300 gallons per day will not in any way work to the material injury of the Hyde Park culinary system. This limit was inserted in the decree altho apparently it was not in the
original contract. Complaint is made as to the indefinitness of both the contract and the decree. The words of
Judge Wolfe in the case of Genola vs. Santaquin City, 96
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Utah 88, Pac. (2nd) 930 constitutes a sufficient answer to
these arguments of indefiniteness:
"When the .contract is read in the light of the
purposes to be accomplished, there is no indefiniteness. Because laymen agree on very definite propos~tions derived from the actualities of the whole
·situation which they must deal with, these propositions do :not become less definite in actuality because lawyers have difficulty legally labeling the
nature of the transactions or in determining the
legal aspects of those transactions. It is but natural that each side will choose to give the transactions that legal aspect which best suits its position."
and again at page 934:
"Specific performance is granted by equity
\vhen it is plain that the party should and can perform and refuses to do so, and injustice not remediable by a money judgn1ent would otherwise result. The nature of the remedy is revealed by the
fact that equity takes a ha,nd because the legal
remedy is inadequate."
Here the contract was sufficiently definite to satisfactorilly work for twenty-eight years and surely all of
the equities and circumstances of this case abundantly appeal to the conscience of the court, that after all of these
years the town of Hyde Park should not be permitted to
repudiate their contract and cut off the culinary water
supply of these defendants and resort to condemnation of
their right of way ignoring the justice and importance of
the matter to the defendants so that the injustice that
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·would not only result to these individuals but to the far
more important proposition of the injustice resulting to
all individuals living w'ithout the corporate limits of municipalities dependent upon their water supply from the
municipal 'vater supply would be a serious injury to farmers all over the state. Public policy requires that far~ wers owning property outside of a city limit ought to be
permitted to utilize drinking water running past their
door where a contract for that purpose has been made in
good faith and we contend the public policy of the Constitution was not intended to prohibit any such contract.
The other asSignments as to the Findings being supported by the evidence are covered in later discussions.
It is the defendants' contention that not only is there
sufficient evidence to sustain the Findings herein but that
the findings are made in accordance with the clear weight
of the evidence, most of which is undisputed.
T,HE CONTRACT TO DELIVER WATER TO THESE

DEFENDANTS WAS VALID AND BINDING.
It is the defendants contention that the contract i:n
1911 was a valid and binding contract whereby the plaintiff secured the right to the use of the right of way as well
as the waters saved by piping the same to the defendants
for which the defendants secured the right to use water
from the pipe line for culinary and stockwatering purposes. It 'is likewise our contention that the contract was
a completed contract and, therefore, has nothing to do
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with the claim of counsel that it is a contract in perpetuity.
It is no more a

~contract

in perpetuity than every exchange

of property or property rights which if completed is a
contract i:n perpetuity.
It is likewise the defendants contention:
1. ·That the contract was not void for the statute
of frauds because it was not only partially performed but was completed and has been acted
upon in accordance with the completed contract
for 28 years.
·2.

The contract was not void as a violation of

the constitutional prohibition against municipalities alienating water rights.
a. Because it is not a contra.ct to sell or dispose of
water ri'ghts belonging to the community but
was a contract whereby these taps were granted
as incidental to the plaintiff acquiring its culinary water system.
b. It was a m.ere agreement to supply water out of
the excess water owned by the plaintiff.
c. There is ample evidence to sustain the contention that the agreement was in fact an exchange
of water or, that plaintiff was delivering to defendants water already owned

by them,

the

plaintiff to retain any water saved by reason of
piping the old culinary streams to the defendants.
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1.
Counsel have cited no authorities and apparently have
not seriously argued that this contract was void because
it was barred by the Statute of Frauds. Section 33-5-8 R.
S. U. 1933 reads as follo"·s:
"33-5-8. Nothing in this chapter contained shall
be construed to abridge the powers of court to compel the specific performance of agreements in case
of part perfor~ance thereof."
and that part performance takes a contraet out of the
Statute of Frauds has been sustaind many times by this
court and no attempt has been made here to exhaust the
authorities on this subject because no authorities have
been cited by the appellants to sustain their contention as
to the Statute of Frauds. Two cases, however, are cited.
Brinton vs. v.,. an Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218;
Lynch vs. C-oviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 Pa.c. 983.

2.
a. It is admitted that the contract was entered into
between these parties and fully performed by both sides
for 27 or 28 years and it i:s our contention that in place of
it being a contract to sell its water works and water rights
it is a contract incidental to, and a part of, its acquiring
its culinary water system that the granting of these two
taps under the circumstances here was one of the incidentals to securing, acquiring and installing its water
works system and no part of any contract for Hyde Park
to sell its water rights.
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No case holding a similar contract to be a sale of its
water rights is cited by plaintiff.
A few of the many cases holding such a contract to
be valid as i:ncidental to acquiring a water works system
are as follows:
Colorado Springs vs.

Color~do

City, 94 Pac. 316.

Colorado Sprin£:!S agreed to furnish water to Colorado
City a.s a part of the consideration of the right of ·way.
They undertook to charge additional rates on the ground
the original contract to furnish water beyond the city
limits was ultra vires.

Held they were bound by their

contract.
Pikes Peak vs. Colorado Springs, 44 CCA 333, 105
Fed. 1.
Colorado Springs granted a contractor certain rights
to the water in consideration of his completing a tunel for
municipal water purposes. City later undertook to repudiate the contract on the grounds that the contract was
ultra vires. Held contract was binding on the City.
Fello\vs vs. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 90 Pac. 137.
City acquired a water system which had previously
furnished water to plai:ntiff's lot. Held city must continue
to ful'nish the water to the lot. The court said:
"The water, as we have seen, was appropriated to
a public use of which the plaintiff was and is a
beneficiary. The city cannot thus continue to hold
and .control property so appropriated to public use
and at the same time refuse the public duty which
such possession and control impose."
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State Ex Rei, Ellenbeck vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah
361, 81 Pac. 273.

Held that a city might exchange irrigation water for
culinary '\vater which involves the idea that water of different quality mar be exchanged.
Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake City Water and Electric
Power Company, ~4 Utah 249, 67 Pac. 672, 25 Utah 456,
71 Pac. 1069.

Held that a priYate po"yer company might condemn
the right to rse a part of the canal in the city's water
system, and likewise held that the power company, under
the law of appropriation, could acquire a secondary right
to the use of the waters owner by the city.
This is a very famous case in which the constitutional
provision now bei·ng discussed was elaborately discussed
by able counsel and is similar to the case at bar in the
respect that the city first entered into an agreement with
the power company which Vl~ later repudiated by the .city
resulting in the litigation. When the case was first decided in February 1902 Judge Bartch speaking for the court
said:
"Nor do we think a secondary water right, such
as is claimed by the power company, is inhibited
by section 6, art. 11, of the constitution. That provision of the fundamental law prohibits the leasing, selling, aliening, or di~posing of water works,
water rights, or sources of water supply by municipalities, and doubtless was also intended as an
i~terdiction against the power of the legislature to
authorize municipalities to lease, sell, alien or dis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
pose of such property; but there is nothing to indicate that it was the intention of the framers of the
constitution thereby to inhibit the acquisition of
secondary water rights, such as the one here under
consideration. We, therefore, regard the constitutional provision above referred to as having no
application to this case."
Very learned counsel took part in this case. George
L. N ye, city attorney for Salt Lake City, C. C. Richards
and Judge J. S. Varian attacked the decision in a motion
for rehearing, Ogden Hiles and Lindsey R. Rogers were
on the. other side and the rehearing was granted and in the
new opinion written Aprillst, 1905, Judge Bartch recognized the importance of the decision and states that a very
thorough examination of the law had been made by the
court,
"Resulting in an irresistable conclusion that the
learned trial judge had made a decision not only
just and w~se, as an application of the principles
growing out of and adapted to the peculiar conditions and necessities of our arid country."
b. It is likevvise well settled under the law of this
state that a municipality may furnish '\Vater to persons living outside of the city limits where they have a surplus of
water. (Statutes and authorities cited later under heading "Utah Law".) Figures have heretofore been given to
show that the municipality has always had and still has
such a surplus

~so

that upon this theory the contract to

furnish the water is not unconstitutional but was at the
time it was entered

i~nto

a valid contract. It is significa:nt
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that for all of the years between the time the first culinary
system was built when because of the inefficiency of the
system, and not for lack of water, there were times when
some citizens in the upper part of Hyde Park had difficulty
getting ample water and it became necessary to limit the
time for sprinkling to two hours per day no one ever
thought of or mentioned shuttmg off the water of these
defendants and even after the new system was built in
Mayor Duce·s time the town continued to furnish water to
these defendants until the election of the new officers in
1938 when this action was brought, notwithstanding the
fact that the evidence clearly is that the town has more
water than a well designed water system requires so that
upon this ground alone it is contended the judgment should
be sustained.
EXC·HANGE OF WATER.
c. The record discloses that two contracts that Hyde
Park entered into with Smithfield Irrigation Company in
both of which contracts they exchanged 25 shares of stock
in the Logan-Northern Canal Company, (then the LoganRichmond Canal Company) for waters from Birch Creek.
The two contracts with Smithfield Irrigation Company
are in evidence, (Tr. 293-297) In the first contract they
agreed to pay the assessments on this water stock. In
other words they merely turned the use of the water stock
to Smithfield Irrigation Company for the use of the springs
in Birch Creek. In the second contract the agreement is
the same except that the stock was transferred to t·he
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Smithfield Irrigation Company

and

they

were

paid

$500.00, the interest from which was supposed to be sufficient to pay the taxes on the water stock. So that if
Hyde Park ever had acquired any additional water after
1911 they did 'not acquire it from the Smithfield Irrigation
Company, and the only fair inference is they acquired it
by their conduct and in this connection the evidence in
this case is undisputed in three particulars.
1. That the defendants were the owners of a culinary
water stream out of Birch Creek Canyon, used by them
for more than twenty years prior to t·he contract and con·struction of the Hyde Park system.
2. That after Hyde Park constructed

its culinary

system in 1911 these defendants abandoned that culinary
stream.
3. That between 1911 and 1935 at least on two occasions Hyde Park undertook to use additional waters in
Birch Creek and that finally for a conveyance back to
Smithfield City of all of their .claims of any nature to the
\Vaters of Birch Canyon a·nd the 'Springs therein they accepted .5 c.f.s. of water at the present spring which flow
must be guaranteed by Smithfield Irrigation Company.
I again repeat that the pleadings are not founded
upon the theory of an express contract or exchange of
water.

Neither was the trial of the case upon any such

theory.

Neither did counsel attempt to induce the wit-

ness, Weeks or his wife, to testify to facts upon that theo-
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ry, but the case was brought and tried upon the theory
that part of the consideration was express and part of it
was implied from the conduct of the parties. The implied
part being that H:yde Park in effect affected the saving
between the culinary stream and the tap, and as between
Hyde Park and Smithfield Irrigation Company and these
defendants became the owners of the water so saved and
this in effect amounts to an exchange of water. The fact
that on cross-examination l\Ir. \Veeks did not expressly
mention the giving up of the culinary stream does not
change the fact that he did give up the stream, a fact
which is not disputed in this case.

PLAIXTIFF'S AUTHORITIES.
Plaintiff cites 43 C. J. 176 and 225 for the general
propositions that municipalities were subject to both the
State and the Federal Constitution. Of course we have no
quarrel with those propositions, and likewise the plaintiff
cites a number of cases where the result ·has been reached
that the action of the municipality officers have been ultra
vires. \Ve do not burden the court with a desertation of
the different facts in these cases cited for the reasons that
they are not similar at all to the facts involved. Cases of
ultra vires acts might be cited worlds without end but
would be neither interesting :nor instructive to the issues
involved in this case.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24·

UTAH LAW.
The policy of the law is not only determined by the
constitution of the State but by the statutes and the decisions of the courts. The statutes defining the policy of
the law i,n this state for those matters are as follows:
"Section 15-8-14. Towns may construct, maintain and operate water works***, and they may
sell and deliver the surplus product or service of
any such works, not requir.ed by the .city or it~ inhabitants to others beyond the city limits."
"Section 15-8-15. They may construct or authorize the construction of water works within or
without the city limits ::: * :!!"
Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433.
Held that money borrowed by Murray City to con·struct a power line outside of the city limits was a
valid city obligation.
In refering to the question of ultra vires the
court states that authorities cited from Oregon and
Washington denying municipalities the right to
operate outside of their ·said city limits are controlled by local statute, and our court says:
"and in this connection it is pertinent to remark
that perhaps no state in the Union .confers greater
powers upon its muncipal corporations than does
the State of Utah."
"In view of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record in this case and the law applicable thereto, the court .can arrive at no other conclusion than that the defendant is. legally liable for
the debt in question. The money was borrowed
for a corporate purpose. It was profitably and
judiciously expended, and the city and its inhabit-
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ants have already derived, and in years to come
will continue to derive, substantial benefits therefrom. I~n these circumstances, even if the transaction were not in all respects regular and in strict
accordance \Yith law. this court does not feel authorized to say that the defendant should be permitted under the plea of ultra vires to escape its
liability.··
The first three cases cited by counsel under the above
heading "Tere determined, as suggested, on a state of
facts antedating the Constitution.

However, the Eller-

beck vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 361, 81 Pac. 273, and
the case of Brummit vs. Water Works Co., 33 Utah 289,
93 Pac. 829, were both decided after the constitutional
provision v.-as enacted.

Counsel says that constitutional

provision in question is clear and needs no construction
and yet it would appear significant to mean that culinary
water could be exchanged for greater volumn of irrigation water a-nd in the Brummit case the court held that it
was proper for the city to make a contract (referred to
as a lea-se for the purpose of the argument) where the
city did not own sufficient water for its needs the court
in refering to this same constitutional provision says:

"Does the constitutional provision above quoted
stand in the way? Our answer is again in the negative. Would it not be most forced and unreasonable construction of the constitutional provision
to say that it meant that a city owning a small
quantity of water entirely insufficient for its
public needs, say nothing of the needs of its inhabitants, .could not make any arrangement with
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any person to permit its water to flow through
the pipes owned and controlled by such person
and to distribute it for use of the city? Would it
alter the case if such an arrangement were called
. a lease? Does it_ not in substance amount to this?
The city has some water but no means of distribution. Some one has the means of distribution
and an additional amount of water, vvhich, if combined with what the city owns, the needs of the
.city and its inhabitants, may be met. In order,
therefore, to make use of the city's water, it enters into an arrangement with the person owning
and controlling the water works and the additional water to permit its water to flow through the
system ow,ned by -such person and in order to preserve its title to the water the city requires the
distributor to make a proper acknowledgment of
this title. The mere fact that the ·city cannot say
that the identical water owned by it is distributed
to it in no ~ray changes the effect of the arrangement. As we have already pointed out, the .city
may exchange water for water, and this in effect
is all that it has done in this case, and that is all
that can in any event be done under the provisions of the ordinance."
Here is a matter it would seem somewhat analogous
to our contention in this case that a city may acquire
water or water works by leasing its water to be co-mingled and used vvith other privately owned waters while in
the case at bar we have them acquiring a right of way
together with whatever water rights they did acquire in
the deal with these defendants as a n1ethod of acquiring
a water works system.
It is very significant that the constitutional provision
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under discussion has been before the Supreme Court of
this state in a comparatively large number of cases 'vith
the Genola case being the last case and in every instance
v.~ays have been found to permit the munieipalities to supply the water outside of their city limits. Not a single
contract in connection with light or water or money borrowed for that purpose has been decided against a city
supplying these items outside the city limits.
It must be that the Supreme Court, feeling that the
true purpose of the constitutional provision was to prevent city water supplies (essentially a public utility necessary for every person in every community) from getting into the hands of private ownership for distribution
to the public and not to prevent the development of this
arid country where good culinary water is so very scarce
and public policy requires its conservation on every hand
and such culinary water is just as essential to the life
and health and development of families residing outside
city limits as inside such communities that some way has
been found to supply the culinary water to the persons
outside of the towns. In the Genola case holding that
$2500.00 in cash and stock in an irrigation company costing $3050.00 which represented water that had to be
taken in turns and not a constant flow was water of equal
value with 119 gallons per minute culinary water constant flow, went much farther to sustain the contract
than is necessary to go here. This in the interest of public policy and development of the state and in no way vio-
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lating the principal that private ownership should not
acquire public water supplies.
We will take time, however, to briefly discuss the
authorities cited by plaintiff from the State of Utah.
Utah Rapid Transit Co. vs. Ogden City, 89 Utah, 546
58 Pac. (2nd) 1.
Held statute authorizing city

to

operate

"Street

Railways" did not authorize Ogden City to enter into the
business of operating motor busses as a common carrier.
News etc. vs. Carbon County, 72 Utah 88, 269 P. 129.
Held county not liable for newspaper publications of
.notice of sale of property (ordered by clerk) where the
property wa·s property of Irrigation District and not the
County.

CONCLUSION.
The judgment should he affirmed, because:
1st. The Findings are not only supported by the evidence but are in accordance with the great weight of the
evidence most of which was undisputed.
2nd.. The contract by which the plaintiff was the
owner of the right of way sought to be condemned was a
valid contract and, therefore, the plaintiff was the owner
of the right of way sought to be condemned and the condemnation proceedings were entirely unnecessary because,
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a. There was sufficient performance to take it out of the

Statute of Frauds.
b. Because it is not a contract to sell or dispose of water

rights belonging to the community but was a contract whereby these taps were granted as incidental
to the plaintiff acquiring its eulinary water system.
c. It was a mere agreement to supply water out of the excess water owned by the plaintiff.
d. There is ample evidence to sustain the contention. that
the agreement was in fact an exchange of water, or,
that plaintiff was deliveri,ng to defendant water already owned by them, the plaintiff to retain any water
saved by reason of piping the old culinary streams
to the defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
M. G. HARRIS,

Attarney for Respondents.
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